Modules
Runtime evidence and assurance for the BEAM.
Bounded call tracing of selected functions as call, call.return,
call.exception, and call.stopped events.
Host-owned ingress defaults for collector sessions.
Supervised, bounded ingestion of structured OTP Logger events.
Bounded capture of finished OpenTelemetry spans as otel.span events.
Periodically records bounded scalar VM and explicitly targeted process samples.
Host-owned, opt-in composition of bounded development/test/CI collectors.
Opaque local capability for one host-owned collector session incarnation.
Supervised, bounded collection of selected ERTS system anomalies.
Bounded, pure-data policy for ERTS system-event collection.
Bounded, allowlist-only ingestion of :telemetry events.
Validated pure-data allowlist for Telemetry collection.
Detects sustained mailbox growth with no observed reductions progress.
A bounded explanation of why a sample could not be evaluated.
Opaque reducer state created by Insider.Detectors.MailboxGrowth.new/1.
Detects repeated abnormal supervisor child terminations without owning a process.
A bounded explanation of why a target event could not be evaluated.
Opaque reducer state created by Insider.Detectors.RestartRecurrence.new/1.
Versioned, bounded, portable evidence shared by collectors and detectors.
Ordering rules for immutable normalized events.
A bounded detector-neutral finding with statically validated details.
Same-node correlation for explicitly declared process identities.
Immutable evidence for one declared process incarnation.
Portable, application-declared diagnostic identity.
A bounded content-addressed reference to evidence kept outside a capsule.
A bounded, redacted, content-addressed incident artifact that validates offline.
Trusted capsule-export classification paired with a redaction policy.
Transport-agnostic live observation of the node it runs in.
Insider.Live operations that each return one canonical JSON binary.
Pure mapping to a mock Datadog Events v2 request body.
A bounded, vendor-neutral projection of a validated incident capsule.
A canonical, provider-shaped mock event derived from an observability export.
Contract for a host-owned asynchronous handoff of inert mock events.
Pure mapping to a mock Sentry event payload.
A bounded, vendor-neutral request for local incident handling.
Pure capability discovery and deny-by-default runtime authorization.
Trusted runtime facts supplied outside the untrusted request envelope.
A bounded, auditable policy outcome. It intentionally excludes capability references.
A pre-verified authorization grant. Cryptographic verification is deliberately external.
Immutable host-owned classification for targets that Insider must not inspect.
Versioned request and effect-honest result constructors.
Hard operation limits negotiated below library-owned ceilings.
An observed runtime effect, including incomplete or uncertain effects.
A typed protocol failure containing bounded, non-secret metadata.
A versioned, bounded request accepted by the Insider runtime.
A typed outcome that keeps values, failures, effects, streams, and cleanup separate.
Bounded, portable provenance for incident evidence.
A bounded, non-mailbox flight recorder for normalized events.
Trusted, bounded sensitivity metadata bound to one exact recorded Event.
The recorder-wide sensitivity and redaction-policy binding that
Insider.Recorder.start_link/1 validates from its classification: option.
Every recorded entry's Insider.Recorder.Classification is derived from it.
Validated recorder configuration derived from Insider.Recorder.start_link/1
options: event, byte, trigger-window, rate-limit, admission-stall, and
source-share bounds plus the trusted classification binding. Hosts do not
construct it directly.
Producer-side capability for one recorder, obtained once with
Insider.Recorder.handle/1.
Immutable, bounded view of a sealed recorder window.
Fail-closed sanitization of untrusted BEAM terms into bounded Event-compatible values.
Credential masking for values that leave the node.
A fully sanitized value and its deterministic disclosure manifest.
A bounded, callback-free redaction policy selected by trusted runtime code.
Bounded, read-only access to runtime diagnostics.
A trusted host bootstrap binding for Runtime protected targets.